Poor Security around Australian PM
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Poor Security around Australian PM
Questions are being asked after a man gatecrashed the newly-elected Australian Prime Minister's victory celebrations.
Tony Abbott stepped onto the stage to join his wife and three daughters when he noticed the intruder.
The man - named by local media as Twiggy Palmcock - stepped forward to shake the bemused PM's hand and then posed for photos with him and his family.
He was tackled by security staff moments later when he moved behind the group and dragged off the stage.
The whole episode was shown live on television, but oddly the commentator made no reference to the gatecrasher.
Watch from 2:17-
Tony Abbott stepped onto the stage to join his wife and three daughters when he noticed the intruder.
The man - named by local media as Twiggy Palmcock - stepped forward to shake the bemused PM's hand and then posed for photos with him and his family.
He was tackled by security staff moments later when he moved behind the group and dragged off the stage.
The whole episode was shown live on television, but oddly the commentator made no reference to the gatecrasher.
Watch from 2:17-
Re: Poor Security around Australian PM
I know it is always easy to pass comments whislt seated but yes I am sorry to say it was poor security measures that were put in place. Once he was on stage then that was it the whole stage should have been sealed off. Nobody should be allowed up.
It reminds me of an incident involving the French President François Hollande.
She was certainly well tackled but an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure as you would say Sabre.....
It is to be noted that on that day Hollande was being protected by nearly an all private CP team... Probably trained to low standards as she came up on stage very easily....
It reminds me of an incident involving the French President François Hollande.
She was certainly well tackled but an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure as you would say Sabre.....
It is to be noted that on that day Hollande was being protected by nearly an all private CP team... Probably trained to low standards as she came up on stage very easily....
Re: Poor Security around Australian PM
Another good example Ted. She was taken down hard!
I also do a little Doorwork and have found that through observation of body language etc you can see a fight/altercation/attack before it occurs. It is much easier to deal with before than after. (prevention is better than cure! )
I also do a little Doorwork and have found that through observation of body language etc you can see a fight/altercation/attack before it occurs. It is much easier to deal with before than after. (prevention is better than cure! )
Re: Poor Security around Australian PM
Agree with you Sabre.
I hope you wear Body Armour when you work on the doors? or at least Knife Protection....
I hope you wear Body Armour when you work on the doors? or at least Knife Protection....
Last edited by Ted-Pencry on 8/9/2013, 20:54; edited 1 time in total
Re: Poor Security around Australian PM
I do indeed Ted, a PPSS covert stab vest, hard plates so also protects against punches/kicks/weapons/blunt trauma, oh, and a pair of Vestguard slash resistant gloves!
Re: Poor Security around Australian PM
Great posts.
I asked another EP group "Who is at fault? Event security or EP Detail?" and the responding response was the EP Detail. Correct; my reasons are as follows (and are generic based on the limited information we have, but the points are valid nonetheless: The failure started way back when during the advance and planning phases; the EP Detail should have met with event security to 1) Understand their defined SOP's for the event and thereafter 2) Identify weak points and then 3) Adjust their own SOP's to fill the gaps. If the aforementioned took place, then the situation is even worse that previously thought. There were a string of failures that enabled this breach to occur 1) Apparent lack of coordination 1.1) Intelligence and Protective Intelligence 2) No RTVA thus no relevant/effective SOP's 3) Access control to the site 4) There seemed to be absolutely no EP at all when the "breach" occurred. This is indicated by the very slow reaction to the unwelcome visitor on stage. To summarise, there seemed to be an all around complacency. Esteemed members, EP is not only about reacting to the "threat" but very much taking all variables and conducting a TRVA and only then defining SOP's. It seems that there was an inaccurate threat and risk analysis conducted and thus if no vulnerabilities are identified, the EP Detail will work in a very "generic" manner and not suited to the situation - the result is clear. It is often common practice for EP Agents to "look down" on other security, such as event security, but esteemed members, understand that they (event security) are your outer ring and cooperation contributes greatly to your mission - the stage security/sterility would and should only be as a result of the RTVA and is not always a given necessity. Where cooperation is not possible, at a minimum, the EP Details should have a comprehensive understanding of event and site security. Without this understanding, how does one conduct a RTV assessment on the event? Without this assessment how do we define relevant SOP's? Cookie cutter SOP's perhaps are the foundation, but are only the starting point of how we should be working. Using cookie cutter methods without conducting RTVA are great as long as no threat actualises, IOW, using cookie cutter methods without adjustment is simply going through the motions, but not providing effective protection.
I asked another EP group "Who is at fault? Event security or EP Detail?" and the responding response was the EP Detail. Correct; my reasons are as follows (and are generic based on the limited information we have, but the points are valid nonetheless: The failure started way back when during the advance and planning phases; the EP Detail should have met with event security to 1) Understand their defined SOP's for the event and thereafter 2) Identify weak points and then 3) Adjust their own SOP's to fill the gaps. If the aforementioned took place, then the situation is even worse that previously thought. There were a string of failures that enabled this breach to occur 1) Apparent lack of coordination 1.1) Intelligence and Protective Intelligence 2) No RTVA thus no relevant/effective SOP's 3) Access control to the site 4) There seemed to be absolutely no EP at all when the "breach" occurred. This is indicated by the very slow reaction to the unwelcome visitor on stage. To summarise, there seemed to be an all around complacency. Esteemed members, EP is not only about reacting to the "threat" but very much taking all variables and conducting a TRVA and only then defining SOP's. It seems that there was an inaccurate threat and risk analysis conducted and thus if no vulnerabilities are identified, the EP Detail will work in a very "generic" manner and not suited to the situation - the result is clear. It is often common practice for EP Agents to "look down" on other security, such as event security, but esteemed members, understand that they (event security) are your outer ring and cooperation contributes greatly to your mission - the stage security/sterility would and should only be as a result of the RTVA and is not always a given necessity. Where cooperation is not possible, at a minimum, the EP Details should have a comprehensive understanding of event and site security. Without this understanding, how does one conduct a RTV assessment on the event? Without this assessment how do we define relevant SOP's? Cookie cutter SOP's perhaps are the foundation, but are only the starting point of how we should be working. Using cookie cutter methods without conducting RTVA are great as long as no threat actualises, IOW, using cookie cutter methods without adjustment is simply going through the motions, but not providing effective protection.
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